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Abstract: Brexit might have profound impacts on the global financial landscape, as the 
global economy and financial markets are increasingly inter-connected. London’s role as the 
top international financial centre in Europe, could be threatened due to the uncertain 
consequences of Brexit. Therefore, the geographies of Asian financial centres might be 
shifted as a result of Brexit, because London plays a central role in the existing global 
financial centre networks and many Asian financial centres, such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore, have strong financial connections with London. On the one hand, how Asian 
financial centres are linked with London and other European financial centres is key to 
understanding the potential impacts of Brexit on them. On the other hand, the reactions to 
Brexit of Asian economies, in particular, China, will also influence the role of London as a 
financial centre. It will in turn influence the geographies of financial centre in Asia. 
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The impact of Brexit on financial centres in Asia will depend on changes in business 
orientation of British and European banks, as well as non-financial firms, following Brexit 
negotiations and regulatory changes (as discussed by Hall and Wójcik, and Dörry and Dymski 
in this issue). The activities of banking and finance have facilitated much of the global spread 
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of trade, production and consumption activities over the past few decades, and financial 
institutions themselves have also become highly globalised in their firm structures and 
business operations. However, domestic markets and economies are still vital for many so-
called ‘global’ banks; despite the attraction of a growing Asian market for financial products 
and services, the importance of home country effect on firm operations cannot be 
underestimated. We have already witnessed this trend from major US and European banks, 
e.g. Morgan Stanley, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, which made major cutbacks on 
international operations following the 2008 global financial crisis and Eurozone crisis. After 
20 years of massive growth and financial globalisation, many of the big global banks have 
become arguably less ‘global’ as they refocus on core business segments particularly in home 
markets, dispose of non-core assets, raise capital ratios, and find ways to tap into new and 
profitable markets without overcommitting to expensive office networks and large teams. 
Such consolidation of banking networks and operations will likely negatively affect smaller 
financial centres in Asia, e.g. Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Taipei, Mumbai, while favouring 
larger financial centres. Singapore and Hong Kong, which already play important roles as 
regional headquarters coordinating market analysis, financial transactions and client networks 
across Asia, could instead see increased firm responsibilities and business coverage as banks 
make the most out of those prime locations.  
As the largest economy in Asia and second largest economy in the world, economic 
activities in China and the growing demand for financial services will have significant impact 
on global financial activities. The last decade has witnessed distinctive overseas expansion of 
Chinese firms. Recently, the “Belt and Road” initiative has become a key national agenda, 
which will continue to push Chinese firms to go abroad. The growing participation of Chinese 
firms in international trade and outward FDI has led many Chinese financial firms to follow 
their domestic clients globally. In addition, the Chinese government has been pushing for the 
internationalisation of the Renminbi (RMB). Chinese financial firms, especially large state-
owned banks, have played prominent roles in this, which has contributed to the significant 
growth of Chinese overseas banking activities and the reconfiguration of market making in 
international financial centres (Hall, 2017). The continuing internationalisation of RMB and 
global expansion of Chinese financial services firms could reshape the geography of global 
finance and the future of existing and potential international financial centres outside of 
China. 
China has strong economic ties with the UK and Brexit will complicate these 
relationships. Amongst European countries, the UK has the largest stock of investments from 
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China. It also has the largest number of Chinese bank branches, with London holding the top 
position in 2015. Brexit negotiations to date has already revealed increased competition 
amongst European cities to attract financial business away from London (see Dörry and 
Dymski in this issue). Following Brexit, Chinese firms will likely think twice about their 
locational strategies when they enter European markets. In particular, when firms set up 
regional headquarters in Europe, London might not enjoy the same locational advantage as 
before. To avoid the uncertainties of Brexit, Chinese financial and non-financial firms might 
opt for other financial centres in Europe, which could create greater opportunities for 
Frankfurt, Luxemburg, Paris and other European cities to obtain more financial functions 
within Europe. Moreover, the power of agglomeration economies suggest that existing 
Chinese financial firms in the UK might relocate to other cities as large European and 
American banks adjust their locational strategies in Europe. Moreover, the competition for 
offshore RMB centres in Europe could be more intense. Many European cities, for instance 
Luxembourg, Frankfurt, Paris, have been trying to increase their roles as offshore RMB 
centres, even as London captures the current top spot as Europe’s most important offshore 
RMB centre. Given the uncertainties surrounding Brexit negotiations, such competitive 
dynamics could change significantly as the Chinese government and Chinese state-owned 
banks turn their attention towards other European financial centres, in the interest of future 
stability.  
With the continuing growth and internationalization of Chinese financial service 
firms, and increasing RMB internationalisation, the financial centres of Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, which have the largest concentration of Chinese financial firms’ headquarters (Lai, 
2012; Pan et al., 2017), could become much more important within global financial centre 
networks. In fact, there is already stiff competition amongst these cities for leadership 
position within China’s financial centre networks. While Brexit might not directly affect 
financial centres in mainland China, the more diversified locational choice of Chinese 
financial firms in Europe could improve the diversity and international connectivity of 
Chinese financial centres, since these cities can have direct connections through intra-firm 
linkages with more cities within Europe rather than with London.  
Brexit’s impact on Hong Kong would be more direct. As a leading financial centre in 
Asia, Hong Kong has long been a vital platform for foreign firms to invest in China as well as 
Chinese firms going abroad (Pan and Brooker, 2014). Moreover, Hong Kong’s strong 
connections with London have also improved the attractiveness of London for Chinese firms 
entering European markets. Given Hong Kong’s unique position in connecting the Chinese 
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economy with the London, uncertainties of the Brexit could negatively impact Hong Kong’s 
gateway function, especially if more global financial giants leave London for other European 
cities. In fact, with the rapid development of financial centres in mainland China, the role of 
Hong Kong as a gateway financial centre is also threatened. Brexit could therefore accelerate 
the reconfiguration of banking and financial services activities in East Asia in ways that could 
favour mainland Chinese financial centres over Hong Kong.  
As the other prominent financial centre in Asia, Singapore is likely to see less direct 
impact from Brexit in terms of the changing business activities of financial firms themselves. 
Instead, some impact might come from trade and foreign direct investments (FDI). Following 
the EU referendum, the depreciating Sterling and the strengthening Singapore Dollar has 
raised concerns over the competitiveness of Singaporean exports of manufactured goods and 
services, which might lead to lower demand for treasury, foreign exchange and insurance 
services out of Singapore. However, the impact has been limited as the UK ranks 22nd on the 
list of Singapore’s key trading partners; the USA and other Asian countries are much more 
important in that respect. In comparison, the EU as a whole is Singapore’s second largest 
trading partner. If Brexit negotiations and regulatory changes should drive economic and 
financial activities more towards European economies and financial centres, these could 
benefit Singapore’s growth in financial activity in the longer term.  
Brexit is also creating much uncertainty for start-ups, tech companies and innovative 
activities, pushing them away from the prolonged and messy negotiation of UK’s EU exit 
towards other financial centres. New York will be a clear winner based on its current 
advantage in venture capital financing, but given the current rise of FinTech industries in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and especially the mainland Chinese market, we expect a significant 
shift in investment and industry interest towards Asian financial centres. FinTech does not 
only rely on financing capabilities and maturity of capital markets, it is also shaped by the 
depth and maturity of firms and actors in related industries, such as media, 
telecommunications and infrastructure, and regulatory environment, which supports 
innovative activities and intellectual property rights. These are well established in the 
financial centres of Singapore and Hong Kong, and have gained much traction in recent years 
in many Chinese cities. The booming internet economies in China and rapid emergence of 
new firms, payment systems, and financing platforms have created a very vibrant market for 
FinTech.  
Elsewhere in this issue, Pollard calls for a reengagement of financial geography with 
political economic questions about the relationships between finance and economic 
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development. This concurs with our approach in organising the above discussion around 
trade, FDI, and strategies of non-financial firms in order to highlight the importance of wider 
economic linkages and production networks for studying the development of financial 
centres. Rather than just focusing on specific types of financial institutions (e.g. retail banks, 
investment banks, institutional investors), or specific financial markets (e.g. equity, 
commodity or derivatives markets), geographers need to pay greater attention to the ways in 
which other economic sectors and wider aspects of economic change can create important 
shifts in firm strategies and industry orientation. In the case of Brexit, impacts on trade and 
investments of non-financial firms will have significant impact on their demands the volume 
and types of financial services and the types of financial institutions and locations best suited 
to meeting those changing needs. Similarly, developments in other industries and changing 
financial ecologies could shape the emergence of new financial sectors such as FinTech and 
alternative financial platforms (Langley and Leyshon, 2017); this could reshape financial 
centre development not only in Asia but global financial networks.  
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